The question was raised as to whether, in a tripartite agency relationship, an employment relationship exists between an employee and their intermediary agency. For instance, Ryanair DAC employs some pilots directly, while subcontracting others. A Mr. Lutz successfully applied to an advertisement for pilots and was contracted on 10 August 2017 by MCG Aviation Ltd. (now Storm Global Ltd.). From July 2018 to January 2020, Mr. Lutz served as a Ryanair-contracted pilot based at Stansted, nominally supplying his services through his own Irish company, Dishford Port Ltd., although it is now accepted that his direct relationship was with MCG. 

Following an incident with Ryanair management on 13 January 2020, MCG terminated its contract with Dishford, effectively ending Mr. Lutz's services. He then brought two claims to tribunal with the support of the British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA) concerning annual leave against MCG under the Civil Aviation (Working Time) Regulations (CAWTR) 2004, and also an equal terms claim against both MCG and Ryanair. Through this action, Mr. Lutz was seeking compensation for not being afforded the same working conditions as employed pilots under the Agency Workers Regulations (AWR) 2010. 

The tribunal found in Mr. Lutz's favour, holding that he was a "crew member" employed by MCG under CAWTR and also an "agency worker" under AWR. Subsequent appeals by Ryanair and MCG were dismissed as, where a worker is supplied by an agency (B) to a principal (C), but has an explicit contract with the agency, the agency remains the employer. Mr. Lutz's services to Ryanair were thus explicitly governed by his contract with MCG, which expressly stated that he was not employed by Ryanair. The fact that Ryanair exercised exclusive direction and control over Mr. Lutz's work does not necessarily create an implied employment contract or relationship with Ryanair, although it befell MCG to ensure that Ryanair respected the relevant employment laws. Moreover, even though Mr. Lutz had a fixed-term contract for several years, it was nonetheless "temporary", thereby creating a gap in protection for agency workers and introducing ‘unacceptable uncertainty’. 

This case reinforces the "substance over form" approach in determining employment status, in that employers can no longer solely rely on contractual labels such as "independent consultant" or "self-employed" as a pretext to deny workers their employment rights, especially in such tripartite agency arrangements. Thus, agencies should understand that workers employed for extended fixed terms are likely still covered by the AWR and thereby entitled to the same T&Cs as direct employees after 12 weeks. Hence, agencies still have clear responsibilities for certain statutory rights, and businesses relying on "supply chain layering" to outsource labour will need to review their structures.

A recent ruling has provided a timely reminder that substance trumps form in employment status disputes, and the mere insertion of a clause does not automatically change the employment status of workers. This case concerns an appeal by BCAL, a company that provides vehicle collection, inspection, delivery, and transportation services. The core dispute revolves around the employment status of hundreds of individuals who work as drivers for BCAL.

The standard-form contract contained a term that permitted the drivers to make use of a substitute. However, a central issue in this case was whether the substitution clause was indeed "genuine". 

BCAL instructs drivers via an app, and they generally have no choice over job location, number, or type, although they can decline jobs. However, the Tribunal found evidence of a practice of punishing drivers for refusing work on available days. BCAL sets the fees for each job, with no power of negotiation available to drivers, and drivers are obligated to pay weekly administration and insurance contributions. BCAL pays for and issues DVLA trade plates to drivers, which are essential for driving unregistered/untaxed vehicles for business, and the drivers cannot obtain these themselves. Drivers are provided with branded items in the form of a badge, a hi-vis vest, a phone with an app, a fuel card, inspection equipment, and PPE. Newly recruited drivers must undertake a mandatory four-day in-person training course and receive a detailed training manual, which is regularly updated.

The Tribunals both found that the substitution clause in BCAL's contracts was not "genuine". This case strongly reiterates that the written terms of a contract, particularly a substitution clause, are not conclusive when determining employment status, as tribunals will rigorously examine the true intentions of the parties and the reality of the working relationship. If a contractual right, such as substitution, is not genuinely intended to be exercised or is an "unrealistic possibility" in practice, it will be disregarded.

Companies cannot simply insert a substitution clause into their contracts and assume this guarantees self-employed status. Instead, the right to substitute must be genuine, practicable, and exercised. This ruling carries profound importance for companies that employ people remotely via apps, as merely inserting a clause to infer that such employment is truly flexible can be overturned if it isn’t exercised.

A recent ruling affirms that an employer is directly liable for the unauthorised disclosure of an employee's private information. An employee worked at a JD Wetherspoon pub for approximately eighteen months, during which time she provided her contact details, including her mother's mobile number as an "emergency contact phone number". These details were kept in her personnel file, conspicuously marked "Strictly Private and Confidential," and locked in a filing cabinet in the manager's office. She ceased working at the pub before Christmas 2018, and her details were properly retained by the defendant.

Throughout 2018, the claimant endured severe abuse from her then-partner, who was arrested in the autumn and held on remand for serious violence and harassment offences. Due to a history of abuse and her desire to avoid further contact with him, she changed her mobile phone number, rendering the number on file obsolete, although her mother's mobile number remained active.

On Christmas Day 2018, while on remand, her ex-partner obtained a mobile phone and called the Wetherspoons pub, falsely identifying himself as a police officer and claiming an urgent need to contact the claimant. A staff member who knew the claimant consulted with the manager, who then accessed the claimant's confidential personnel file, transcribed her mother's mobile number, and instructed the staff member to provide it to the caller.  

The ex-partner then called the claimant's mother, who was out at a Christmas lunch with her family, including the claimant. Again impersonating a police officer, he persuaded the mother of his urgent need to speak to the claimant, and the phone was passed to her, whereupon she was verbally abused and threatened. Not only had the abusive relationship and her fear of contact been disclosed to the manager on several occasions, but Wetherspoons was aware that "pretexting" is a known threat and that their staff was trained concerning such threats.  

The claimant successfully sought damages pertaining to the misuse of private information and breach of confidence, although claims of further breaches under the Data Protection Act (DPA) 2018 and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2018, while initially dismissed, were later upheld by the High Court.

Here, there is a clear distinction drawn between a failure to keep data secure online and an active disclosure of data by the employer's staff. Employers must not only have policies in place but also ensure that they are understood and followed in practice. Such training must be robust and regularly reinforced to avoid being found vicariously liable. It is simply insufficient to have a "Strictly Private and Confidential" label or issue a training manual. An employee's emergency contact details, even if they are those of a relative, constitute private information, and employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

A Tribunal has provided a landmark ruling over employer-employee status in the context of direct payments made under the Care Act 2014, ruling that an LA was not in fact the direct employer of a carer. The appeal revolved around the question of whether the LA was the de facto employer of V, who had provided care and support to his adult brother, S, between 2013 and 2020. V was paid directly by the LA via the Care Act 2014 under a contract of employment. 

V claimed race and disability discrimination, as well as payment arrears, asserting a formal employment relationship with the LA. The Appeal Tribunal rejected all of V's claims and found no error of law in the original Tribunal’s approach, as there was no basis for an implied contract with V. The Tribunal’s findings of fact, such as his brother S's control of the budget, payslips naming S, and their family arranging cover, clearly pointed to S as the employer. The test for implying such a contract is a "necessity" in explaining the parties' actions, which was not met here, given the express contract with S.

As such, direct payments are a valid method by which an LA may discharge its statutory duty under the Care Act 2014. As to the issue of S's capacity to enter into a contract of employment, the Judge agreed with the LA that capacity is a matter for medical evidence and not mere assertion. Even if S had lacked capacity, it would have made the contract voidable, not void, and would not have necessitated an implied contract with the LA. This decision strongly affirms that LAs can effectively discharge their statutory duties under the Care Act 2014 by making direct payments, without automatically becoming the employer of the carers. This case illustrates how courts will seek to determine the identity of the employer in such direct payment arrangements. Those employed via such direct payment schemes are unlikely to be able to claim employment status with the LA unless there is compelling evidence that the LA retained significant and direct control over their day-to-day work. This case has far-reaching implications for freelancers and so employers should always seek to clarify whether any direct payments constitute a formal employer-employee relationship to avoid legal pitfalls.

A recent tribunal clarified the procedural powers of the Certification Officer (CO), ruling that applications from trade union members cannot be refused simply because they are deemed "unarguable". After becoming Chair of a prestigious university, the appellant faced three internal complaints from other members/staff of the UCU involving bullying; a complaint regarding his decision not to permit a motion for an AGM at an EGM; and a data protection breach complaint from three managers after he included information about them.

All three complaints were investigated and upheld by an NEC panel of the UCU on 13 December 2021. The UCU rules, specifically 6.1 and 13.1, outline obligations for members to abide by the rules, refrain from detrimental conduct, and provide for disciplinary procedures, including censure, barring from office, suspension, or expulsion for breaches of rules or detriment to the UCU's interests.

On the 6th September 2022, the appellant submitted nine applications to the CO, alleging that the disciplinary procedure applied in his case had been unlawful, although the CO refused to accept these on the grounds that they were "not arguable" and a tribunal appeal followed. The tribunal ruled that the applications should be remitted to the CO due to the fact that the case did not meet the criteria for striking out under Section 256ZA, ruling that the CO erred in law. The CO's power to "refuse to accept" an application under Section 108B of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (TULRCA) 1992 is narrowly confined to those instances where the CO is unsatisfied that the applicant has exhausted internal union complaints procedures. The phrase "unless he is satisfied" in Section 108B(1) means that if the CO is satisfied that internal procedures have been exhausted, he or she cannot refuse to accept the application on that ground. The primary mechanism for striking out applications on substantive grounds is Section 256ZA(1). Crucially, this section requires a "show cause" notice under Section 256ZA(4) – giving the applicant an opportunity to explain why their application should not be struck out.

This judgement reaffirms the procedural powers of the CO when handling applications against trade unions, strongly reinforcing the requirement for due process, specifically the "opportunity to be heard" before an application can be dismissed. This important case clarifies that, once internal union procedures are exhausted, the CO must accept any application and commence inquiries, even if those inquiries might later lead to a formal strike-out process with proper safeguards.