Many modern companies insist on the inclusion of restrictive covenants to limit the freedoms of employees upon the termination of their contracts. However, the High Court recently reinforced the stringent legal principles governing the enforceability of such restrictive covenants, suggesting that they often overstep.

A young man had been working as a salesperson for a UK subsidiary of an American company that sells made-to-measure suits and shirts manufactured in the USA. His original contract included restrictive covenants limited to 6 months. However, the contract was changed in 2022 to double the duration of the non-compete covenant to 12 months and remove the previous reliefs, significantly widening their scope. The employee asserted that he was not informed of these changes, and the claimant failed to produce any evidence to justify the widening of the scope of the limitations or the doubling of their duration.

The employee’s initial performance was strong, although following a conduct issue in January 2025, he was subjected to an addendum requiring humiliating and intrusive conditions, including weekly “counselling”, a ban from earned trips, and exclusion from leadership roles. The ex-employee had also raised product quality concerns, which he felt were ignored, and found the work culture ‘toxic’ and the disciplinary action both unfair and intrusive. As a consequence, he resigned in frustration in 2025, only to be subjected to an “insensitive, verging on brutal” retaliation. Within two days, the HR manager had cut off all IT access, threatened an investigation, and banned the defendant from the office. A day later, on Sunday, the claimant’s lawyers hand-delivered a threatening letter to the defendant’s home seeking to enforce a 12-month restrictive covenant. Moreover, there were claims that the defendant had breached his contractual duties, including running down his sales in the months prior to his resignation, and soliciting staff.

The High Court dismissed the claim for breach of contract and ruled that the 12-month restrictive covenant was unenforceable, as it far exceeded what was reasonably necessary to protect the claimant’s business. Moreover, the Court found the decline in performance to be stress-related and due to his inevitable demotivation.

This case reinforces the longstanding principle that courts will not uphold a covenant if it extends beyond what is strictly necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate business interests, which are typically delimited to confidential information and customer goodwill. The case serves as a warning in relation to the risks employers run when their conduct is perceived to be heavy-handed, humiliating, or toxic, particularly during disciplinary or exit procedures. HR departments should be wary of engaging in overtly humiliating or heavy-handed disciplinary rituals, as these may be viewed as a form of brutality.

The claimant began employment as a Contracts Coordinator on 23 January 2023, subject to a contractual 6-month probationary period, one which required 5 weeks’ notice for termination. The contract included a garden leave clause, but no clause permitting Payment in Lieu of Notice (PILON). 

Disputes soon arose over his work patterns and behaviour, and by 22 February 2023, the claimant had emailed the respondent detailing an irrevocable breakdown in trust and confidence. On 3 March 2023, HR obtained authorisation to dismiss the claimant, citing inflexibility, divergent values, negative communications, and uncooperative behaviour.

The decision to terminate his employment had in fact already been made, even though a “Formal Probation Assessment Meeting” had been scheduled for 15 March, on which date he was dismissed with immediate effect and paid 5 weeks’ notice monies. On 24 March 2023, he appealed the dismissal while seeking an assurance that he would not be reinstated, affirming that neither party wished the employment relationship to continue. The employment tribunal found that the claimant had not been wrongfully dismissed, despite accepting that the respondent had breached the contract by instituting a PILON.

The appeal tribunal found that the first tribunal had erred in law by failing to find that the claimant was wrongfully dismissed, as the employment contract did not contain a PILON clause and the employer’s action in dismissing the claimant with immediate effect and simply handing over the notice pay constituted a breach of contract. However, it upheld the earlier decision not to award compensation after applying established common law principles for assessing damages, which assume that the employer would have terminated the contract in the least burdensome way that was lawfully available. The appeal tribunal rejected the claimant’s argument that damages should be subject to the “Gunton extension” to cover the full 6-month probation period. As the issue was a fundamental breakdown of the employment relationship, the employer was entitled to rely on the simpler, contractual 5-week notice clause, rendering the lengthier procedural steps irrelevant in the calculation of damages.

This case offers a stark reminder that, if a company wishes to dismiss an employee with immediate effect and simply pay them in lieu of notice, then the contract must explicitly include a PILON clause, or any immediate dismissal (even with payment) is effectively a breach of contract. While no financial damages were awarded in this specific instance, it nonetheless positions an employer on the wrong side of the law and can complicate any prospective litigation.

A recent ruling has established that temporary worker arrangements do not constitute a single, continuous employment relationship in which workers retain the unfettered right to refuse assignments. This effectively confirms the prerequisite for a mutuality of obligation when accruing tax breaks.

Mainpay engaged temporary workers in the service sector, contending that its employment relationship constituted a single, albeit discontinuous form of employment, effectively rendering its various workplaces transient. Based on this viewpoint, Mainpay reimbursed its workers for travel and subsistence expenses and deducted these amounts from their income for tax purposes. Mainpay also used rounded sums, or benchmark scales, for subsistence expenses without obtaining formal dispensation from HMRC.

HMRC argued that each assignment was a separate instance of employment, making each workplace permanent for the purpose of a given assignment. This meant that travel and subsistence expenses were likely non-deductible without dispensation.

As the two contracts in question (2010 & 2013) were issued more than four years after the relevant tax year, this required HMRC to prove that the loss of tax was "brought about carelessly" by Mainpay so as to justify a six-year extended time limit. The Tribunal ruled in their favour, finding that neither the 2010 nor the 2013 contract constituted overarching contracts of employment, as the workers retained the unfettered right to refuse assignments. This, in turn, meant they lacked the necessary mutuality of obligation in the gaps between assignments. The Tribunal held that each assignment was an instance of separate employment and that the workplaces were therefore, in effect, permanent, making the expenses non-deductible. The Tribunal also found that Mainpay was "careless" in claiming the deductions, particularly in relation to the 2010 contract, because it had relied on vague assurances from employment lawyers.

This contention was escalated to the Court of Appeal, which rejected Mainpay’s argument that the parties’ intention should be decisive in construing the contract, as what essentially mattered was the reality of the arrangement, which was one of intermittent employment. Thus, each assignment was effectively under a separate contract of employment for the purposes of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (ITEPA) and, therefore, created a permanent workplace. The Court further upheld the finding that the loss of tax was "brought about carelessly" by Mainpay, validating the extended assessment time limit permitted under the Taxes Management Act 1970 (TMA).  

The case provides a clear distinction between a general agreement that governs future work and an actual contract of employment that lays out the terms under which future, separate contracts of employment will be formed. This type of agreement alone does not create a state of continuous employment. Companies are thus advised to seek advice when creating discontinuous employment frameworks in an effort to minimise tax liabilities.

Ms Constantine had been a veterinary surgeon since 2017. Initially, she had worked every day with two half days rest, but this increased to four full days and a weekend every three weeks. Moreover, she was required to seek permission to be absent on those days she was not required to attend work. In November 2020, Ms Constantine began a sickness absence, claiming burnout, and was certified as being unfit to work from 1 December 2020 to 4 January 2021 due to anxiety. In May 2021, a ‘fit for work’ statement recommended one day a week, which was subsequently increased in June 2021 to one and a half days a week, with at least one day off between workdays. 

Following a meeting on 22 June 2022, the respondent agreed to look into issuing a new contract for a three-and-a-half-day week with two in six weekends. A proposed contract with a covering letter dated 24 August 2022 was sent to the claimant with a £23,267 gross salary per annum, which was not in alignment with the agreed basis that it should be based, pro rata, on her previous full-time salary of £44,000 p.a. The claimant contended that the revised salary calculations were severely flawed and effectively constituted a 22.4% pay cut based on a new notional denominator of 260 working days in the form of a ‘take it or leave it’ offer. 

Further, a series of unauthorised wage deductions had been made from May 2021 to 31 July 2023, and Ms Constantine ultimately resigned in 2023, lodging a formal grievance on 14 March 2023, specifically complaining about the basis of the calculations of her pro-rata pay from May 2021, asserting a breach of the Part-Time Worker (PTW) Regulations 2000 and unlawful deduction from wages.

The Tribunal ruled in favour of Ms Constantine, finding an unlawful deduction from wages, constructive unfair dismissal, and unfavourable treatment arising in consequence of disability, and she was awarded a total of £19,017.  Ms Constantine was deemed to have been a disabled person from December 2021 due to chronic fatigue, as the respondent should have known, and the act of proposing a new part-time contract in August 2022 at a disproportionately low salary constituted unfavourable treatment arising from the claimant’s need to reduce her hours due to disability (s.15 Equality Act 2010).

The claim for constructive unfair dismissal was upheld because the respondent had committed a fundamental breach of contract by withholding admitted back pay and making its payment conditional on the claimant agreeing to the proposed future salary. Finally, the Tribunal found that an unauthorised deduction from wages had occurred, applying the Apportionment Act 1870 to set the lawful deduction rate at 1/365th of the annual salary for days the claimant was rostered to work but was absent.

When seeking to reduce an employee's hours, any resulting contract must be calculated correctly on a pro-rata basis in accordance with the PTWs. Employers must prove that any proposed pay revisions are not only fair, but also "necessary and appropriate" to achieve a legitimate business aim. Above all, employers must never deliberately withhold payment in an effort to coerce an employee into agreeing to new contractual terms. Such an act risks breaching the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, creating grounds for constructive unfair dismissal.

Recently, a clear legal precedent confirmed that the nature of an individual's work is determined by the reality of the actual employment relationship rather than by arbitrary titles. Mr. Gooch worked for the British Free Range Egg Producers Association (BFREPA) from 1 November 2011 until 26 April 2024, initially as a Policy Director on a "contracted services basis" for 2.5 days per week. The organisation, originally an unincorporated association, subsequently became an incorporated company in 2023 (BFREPA Ltd.), although the nature of its work was unaltered.

As Mr. Gooch's role evolved, so his compensation increased and, by 2016, he had effectively been promoted to Chief Executive of Services. Throughout his 12.5 years of engagement, he consistently submitted monthly invoices and was paid a retainer due to his self-employed status, without formally establishing a limited company. In February 2023, BFREPA's leadership expressed concern that their arrangement with Mr. Gooch looked remarkably similar to an employment relationship rather than a self-employed contract, even suggesting that the HMRC would likely classify him as an employee.

As a consequence, in March 2023, BFREPA gave him 12 months' notice of termination, and he continued working until April 2024, at which point his email access was disabled, and he received a letter confirming that his contract would not be renewed. Mr. Gooch duly lodged claims against both defendants for unfair dismissal, unauthorised deductions from wages, unpaid holiday, wrongful dismissal for failure to pay statutory notice, and breach of contract relating to pension auto-enrolment. 

The Tribunal ruled that the claimant was a de facto employee, working under a contract of employment as defined by Section 230(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, Section 2 of the Working Time Regulations 1998, and Section 88(2) of the Pensions Act 2008. The Tribunal further concluded that personal service was a core requirement of the contract, one which contained no general substitution clause, and that the extent of the control was consistent with an employer-employee relationship for a senior employee alongside other strong indicators of a permanent employment relationship. The contracts also contained restrictive clauses that limited his ability to work for other companies in the same sector, a feature more commonly found in employment contracts than in contracts for service. 

This ruling provides a clear and detailed example of how a tribunal will look beyond the contractual terms to assess whether a person is an employee or a self-employed contractor. Employers cannot rely on a "contract for services" or a person's self-employed status to avoid the legal obligations of an employer. Instead, tribunals will scrutinise key factors such as the mutuality of the obligations, the degree of control, and the extent of integration in the business. Employers who treat long-term contractors like employees—providing them with a fixed monthly retainer, dictating their hours, and effectively integrating them into the business—risk having them reclassified as employees, and HR departments should ensure that contracts reflect the true nature of the relationship to avoid repercussions.