Recently, a clear legal precedent confirmed that the nature of an individual's work is determined by the reality of the actual employment relationship rather than by arbitrary titles. Mr. Gooch worked for the British Free Range Egg Producers Association (BFREPA) from 1 November 2011 until 26 April 2024, initially as a Policy Director on a "contracted services basis" for 2.5 days per week. The organisation, originally an unincorporated association, subsequently became an incorporated company in 2023 (BFREPA Ltd.), although the nature of its work was unaltered.

As Mr. Gooch's role evolved, so his compensation increased and, by 2016, he had effectively been promoted to Chief Executive of Services. Throughout his 12.5 years of engagement, he consistently submitted monthly invoices and was paid a retainer due to his self-employed status, without formally establishing a limited company. In February 2023, BFREPA's leadership expressed concern that their arrangement with Mr. Gooch looked remarkably similar to an employment relationship rather than a self-employed contract, even suggesting that the HMRC would likely classify him as an employee.

As a consequence, in March 2023, BFREPA gave him 12 months' notice of termination, and he continued working until April 2024, at which point his email access was disabled, and he received a letter confirming that his contract would not be renewed. Mr. Gooch duly lodged claims against both defendants for unfair dismissal, unauthorised deductions from wages, unpaid holiday, wrongful dismissal for failure to pay statutory notice, and breach of contract relating to pension auto-enrolment. 

The Tribunal ruled that the claimant was a de facto employee, working under a contract of employment as defined by Section 230(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, Section 2 of the Working Time Regulations 1998, and Section 88(2) of the Pensions Act 2008. The Tribunal further concluded that personal service was a core requirement of the contract, one which contained no general substitution clause, and that the extent of the control was consistent with an employer-employee relationship for a senior employee alongside other strong indicators of a permanent employment relationship. The contracts also contained restrictive clauses that limited his ability to work for other companies in the same sector, a feature more commonly found in employment contracts than in contracts for service. 

This ruling provides a clear and detailed example of how a tribunal will look beyond the contractual terms to assess whether a person is an employee or a self-employed contractor. Employers cannot rely on a "contract for services" or a person's self-employed status to avoid the legal obligations of an employer. Instead, tribunals will scrutinise key factors such as the mutuality of the obligations, the degree of control, and the extent of integration in the business. Employers who treat long-term contractors like employees—providing them with a fixed monthly retainer, dictating their hours, and effectively integrating them into the business—risk having them reclassified as employees, and HR departments should ensure that contracts reflect the true nature of the relationship to avoid repercussions. 

Mr. Aslam, a former Metroline employee, applied to another bus company on 13 April 2019, disclosing that he suffered from partial hearing loss, depression, anxiety, insomnia and stress, and was interviewed on 14 May 2019. He disclosed that he had been dismissed by his former employer on the grounds of capability and was actively pursuing a tribunal claim.

He was conditionally offered a role and attended induction, although the offer was subsequently withdrawn, and no reference had been obtained from Metroline despite numerous requests. Moreover, he was not allowed to work shifts before he attended induction, while two other candidates were permitted to do so. During the induction process, the claimant emailed the respondent to enquire whether he was being treated differently from the other candidates for the job because of his race. This, coupled with the tribunal claim, had led to a withdrawal of the offer on 20 June 2019. 

The claimant claimed direct race discrimination and victimisation after he had informed the respondent about a tribunal claim against Metroline. The Employment Tribunal found that the job offer had been withdrawn because the respondent believed the claimant was likely to be protected under the Equality Act 2010, Section 27(1)(b) and upheld the claimant’s victimisation claim, although it subsequently reversed its judgement and dismissed the claim. The claimant appealed and the original judgement was reinstated. 

The judgement serves as a clear warning to employers, as withdrawing a job offer or taking other detrimental action based on a person's history of bringing claims, or a perceived likelihood that they may bring one in the future, can itself constitute an act of victimisation under the Equality Act. Employers should tread carefully before weighing pending tribunal cases in their decisions to make or withdraw formal offers of employment.

An extended civil restraint order (ECRO) was issued against a prolific Employment Tribunal (ET) litigant for presenting repeated and baseless claims.

A Mr. Khan has been described as a prolific litigant, having issued no fewer than 42 largely unsuccessful tribunal claims since 2017. These various failed claims have typically involved allegations of disability discrimination and a failure to make reasonable adjustments in recruitment processes. Many claims were struck out for having no reasonable prospect of success or simply as an abuse of process. Only two claims, levelled against solicitors' firms, were settled for "nuisance value payments" of £700 and £1,000. Mr. Khan has also made many unsuccessful applications to adjourn hearings, often on medical grounds, alongside numerous failed attempts to challenge ET decisions.

The High Court granted the claimants’ application for an ECRO, restraining the defendant from issuing or presenting claims or appeals related to job applications in the tribunal system without prior court permission for a period of three years. 

This decision strengthens the mechanisms available to safeguard judicial processes from abuse. It reaffirms that higher courts can step in to protect tribunals from those individuals who repeatedly file baseless claims or appeals without legal merit. This is crucial for preventing the system from being overwhelmed by vexatious litigation, ensuring that resources are available for legitimate disputes.

For individuals who represent themselves in court, while the judiciary strives to ensure fairness and assist unrepresented parties, the case firmly reiterates that procedural rules and the fundamental principles of legal merit still apply. It demonstrates that courts will not tolerate the deliberate misuse of legal processes. Thus, employers and their legal counsel should be wary of disgruntled employees with histories of spurious claims and seek to have baseless claims struck out on such grounds.  

The question was raised as to whether, in a tripartite agency relationship, an employment relationship exists between an employee and their intermediary agency. For instance, Ryanair DAC employs some pilots directly, while subcontracting others. A Mr. Lutz successfully applied to an advertisement for pilots and was contracted on 10 August 2017 by MCG Aviation Ltd. (now Storm Global Ltd.). From July 2018 to January 2020, Mr. Lutz served as a Ryanair-contracted pilot based at Stansted, nominally supplying his services through his own Irish company, Dishford Port Ltd., although it is now accepted that his direct relationship was with MCG. 

Following an incident with Ryanair management on 13 January 2020, MCG terminated its contract with Dishford, effectively ending Mr. Lutz's services. He then brought two claims to tribunal with the support of the British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA) concerning annual leave against MCG under the Civil Aviation (Working Time) Regulations (CAWTR) 2004, and also an equal terms claim against both MCG and Ryanair. Through this action, Mr. Lutz was seeking compensation for not being afforded the same working conditions as employed pilots under the Agency Workers Regulations (AWR) 2010. 

The tribunal found in Mr. Lutz's favour, holding that he was a "crew member" employed by MCG under CAWTR and also an "agency worker" under AWR. Subsequent appeals by Ryanair and MCG were dismissed as, where a worker is supplied by an agency (B) to a principal (C), but has an explicit contract with the agency, the agency remains the employer. Mr. Lutz's services to Ryanair were thus explicitly governed by his contract with MCG, which expressly stated that he was not employed by Ryanair. The fact that Ryanair exercised exclusive direction and control over Mr. Lutz's work does not necessarily create an implied employment contract or relationship with Ryanair, although it befell MCG to ensure that Ryanair respected the relevant employment laws. Moreover, even though Mr. Lutz had a fixed-term contract for several years, it was nonetheless "temporary", thereby creating a gap in protection for agency workers and introducing ‘unacceptable uncertainty’. 

This case reinforces the "substance over form" approach in determining employment status, in that employers can no longer solely rely on contractual labels such as "independent consultant" or "self-employed" as a pretext to deny workers their employment rights, especially in such tripartite agency arrangements. Thus, agencies should understand that workers employed for extended fixed terms are likely still covered by the AWR and thereby entitled to the same T&Cs as direct employees after 12 weeks. Hence, agencies still have clear responsibilities for certain statutory rights, and businesses relying on "supply chain layering" to outsource labour will need to review their structures.

A recent ruling has provided a timely reminder that substance trumps form in employment status disputes, and the mere insertion of a clause does not automatically change the employment status of workers. This case concerns an appeal by BCAL, a company that provides vehicle collection, inspection, delivery, and transportation services. The core dispute revolves around the employment status of hundreds of individuals who work as drivers for BCAL.

The standard-form contract contained a term that permitted the drivers to make use of a substitute. However, a central issue in this case was whether the substitution clause was indeed "genuine". 

BCAL instructs drivers via an app, and they generally have no choice over job location, number, or type, although they can decline jobs. However, the Tribunal found evidence of a practice of punishing drivers for refusing work on available days. BCAL sets the fees for each job, with no power of negotiation available to drivers, and drivers are obligated to pay weekly administration and insurance contributions. BCAL pays for and issues DVLA trade plates to drivers, which are essential for driving unregistered/untaxed vehicles for business, and the drivers cannot obtain these themselves. Drivers are provided with branded items in the form of a badge, a hi-vis vest, a phone with an app, a fuel card, inspection equipment, and PPE. Newly recruited drivers must undertake a mandatory four-day in-person training course and receive a detailed training manual, which is regularly updated.

The Tribunals both found that the substitution clause in BCAL's contracts was not "genuine". This case strongly reiterates that the written terms of a contract, particularly a substitution clause, are not conclusive when determining employment status, as tribunals will rigorously examine the true intentions of the parties and the reality of the working relationship. If a contractual right, such as substitution, is not genuinely intended to be exercised or is an "unrealistic possibility" in practice, it will be disregarded.

Companies cannot simply insert a substitution clause into their contracts and assume this guarantees self-employed status. Instead, the right to substitute must be genuine, practicable, and exercised. This ruling carries profound importance for companies that employ people remotely via apps, as merely inserting a clause to infer that such employment is truly flexible can be overturned if it isn’t exercised.